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Samuel Zell, the Chicago Tribune, and the 
Emergence of the S ESOP: Understanding the 
Tax Advantages and Disadvantages of S ESOPs 
MICHAEL S. KNOLL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2007, Samuel Zell acquired the Chicago Tribune Company 
(Tribune) using a little-known type of Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
(ESOP). In a complicated transaction, which took nearly a year to complete, 
the Tribune converted from a subchapter C corporation to a subchapter 
S corporation, established an ESOP that purchased 100 percent of the 
company’s equity, and sold Zell a call option giving him the right to 
purchase forty percent of the company’s equity.1 Less than a year after Zell 
completed his acquisition of the Tribune, the Tribune filed for bankruptcy, a 
victim of the recession, declining newspaper advertising revenues, and the 
Tribune’s debt-laden capital structure.2 
Outside of bankruptcy, ESOPs are rarely in the news. Only when they 
have a connection to a high-profile corporate bankruptcy—most notably the 
bankruptcies of United Airlines, Enron, Polaroid, and now the Tribune—do 
ESOPs grab the headlines.3 One reason for the lack of attention paid to 
ESOPs might be that both liberals and conservatives generally support 
ESOPs as a way of encouraging an “ownership society.” Yet in spite of their 
low profile, ESOPs have a large presence in the U.S. economy. 
According to the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), as 
of February 2008, there were 9,774 ESOPs with total assets in excess of $928 
billion.4 Those ESOPs covered 11.2 million employees5—one out of every 
twelve private sector employees in the United States, and roughly half of all 
                                                                                                                   
* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and 
Professor of Real Estate, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. I thank Tom 
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1 Bill McIntyre, The Tribune Company ESOP, OWNERS AT WORK, Summer 2007, at 
8 (OWNERS AT WORK is published by the Ohio Employee Ownership Center at Kent State 
University). 
2 Phil Rosenthal & Michael Oneal, Tribune Co. Files for Bankruptcy Protection, 
CHI. TRIB. REDEYE EDITION, Dec. 9, 2008, at 8. 
3 See Susan Chandler et al., An ESOP Surely; Zell’s Probably; Chicago Billionaire 
Said to Have Edge as Tribune Choice Nears, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 2007, at C1. 
4 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (2008), available at http://www.nceo.org/library/eo_stat.html. 
5 Id. 
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employees who own stock in their employer hold their shares through an 
ESOP.6 
The majority of ESOPs are sponsored by companies that are taxed under 
subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). These entities, which are 
commonly called C corporations, pay the corporate tax. Keeping with that 
terminology, ESOPs sponsored by such corporations are called C ESOPs. 
Although ESOPs are more than thirty years old,7 until 1998, corporations 
taxed under subchapter S of the Code could not sponsor ESOPs.8 
S corporations are corporations that do not pay the corporate tax.9 Instead, 
items of income and expense are passed through an S corporation to its 
shareholders.10 S corporations are subject to a wide range of restrictions, 
including a limit on the number of shareholders (100),11 a prohibition on 
issuing more than one class of stock,12 and restrictions on who can be a 
shareholder.13 Until Congress changed the law in the late 1990’s, an ESOP 
could not own the stock of an S corporation.14 In 1996 and 1997, Congress 
made several changes in the tax law, which opened the way for 
S corporations to sponsor ESOPs.15 
                                                                                                                   
6 Steven F. Freeman, Effects of ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: Thirty 
Years of Research and Experience 2 (Univ. of Pa. Ctr. for Organizational Dynamics, 
Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007), available at http://www.community-
wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/esops/paper-freeman.pdf. The next most popular 
means for employees to hold employer shares is through a 401(k) plan. Id. 
7 For a brief history of the development of ESOPs, see Corey Rosen, How 
S Corporation ESOPs Came To Be, in INTRODUCTION TO S CORPORATION ESOPS 1 (Scott 
Rodrick ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
8 Id. at 5. 
9 The exemption of S corporations from the corporate income tax is by virtue of 
I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2009). 
10 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (2007). 
11 Id. 
12 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). 
13 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1). Only individuals, estates, certain trusts, and exemption 
organizations can hold the shares of an S corporation. Id. 
14 Until 1998, an ESOP was not a permissible shareholder of an S corporation. Prior 
to 1998, if an ESOP held shares in an S corporation the corporation would not be eligible 
to be taxed as an S corporation and so it would be taxed as a C corporation. Robert W. 
Smiley, Jr., & Gregory K. Brown, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: DESIGN FUNDING AND ADMINISTRATION 733, 796 
(Jerry S. Rosenbloom ed., 6th ed. 2005); I.R.C. § 409(h)(B) (2000) (effective date after 
December 31, 1997).  
15 Among the most important of these acts was the Small Business Job Protection 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, which added I.R.C. § 1361(c)(6), effective for tax 
years beginning after December 31, 1997. This section allows ESOPs to own shares of 
S corporations without disqualifying the corporation’s election to be taxed as an 
S corporation (that section further provides that an ESOP counts as a single shareholder) 
and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, which repealed the application 
of the unrelated business income tax to an employee benefit trust if it held shares in an 
S corporation. 
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Over the last ten years, S ESOPs have flourished.16 According to some 
estimates, S ESOPs account for as much as 40 percent of all ESOPs.17 And 
according to some experts, over the last few years, C ESOP adoptions have 
dwindled, with most recent ESOP adoptions being S ESOPs (especially 100-
percent owned S ESOPs).18  
In spite of their economic impact, S ESOPs were, until recently, largely 
hidden from public view. That changed in April 2007, when Samuel Zell, the 
Chicago financier and real estate investor, announced that he had reached a 
deal to acquire the Tribune for $8.2 billion in a transaction using an 
S ESOP.19  
The Tribune is a media giant. When the deal was announced, the Tribune 
owned twenty-three television stations, including stations in New York, Los 
Angeles, and Chicago; fifteen newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune 
and the Los Angeles Times; and had 23,000 employees.20 In addition, the 
Tribune owned the Chicago Cubs baseball team and Wrigley Field.21 
Because of the size of the Tribune deal and the Tribune’s ownership of 
several American icons, Zell’s Tribune transaction brought S ESOPs into 
public view.22  
Press reports contain numerous suggestions that the tax benefits from 
Zell’s innovative transaction allowed Zell to increase his bid for the Tribune 
over those of his rivals.23 Several prominent financial commentators 
predicted that many acquirers would employ the same structure when 
                                                                                                                   
16 See Corey Rosen, ESOPs in S corporations, in COREY ROSEN & SCOTT RODRICK, 
UNDERSTANDING ESOPS 39 (2008). S ESOPs also have their own trade association: 
Employee-Owned S corporations of America (ESCA). 
17 Proposed Synthetic Equity Tax Threatens Future S-Corp ESOPs, OWNERS AT 
WORK (Ohio Employee Ownership Center, Kent State University), Winter 2007/2008, at 
3. 
18 That view was expressed by several experts in attendance at the ESOP 
Roundtable sponsored by the Center for Organizational Dynamics at the University of 
Pennsylvania on May 3, 2008. 
19 Although press reports regularly describe the acquisition price for the Tribune as 
$8.2 billion, the Tribune has $13 billion in outstanding debt, the difference being prior 
debt that was not retired as part of the Zell deal. See Fran Spielman & David Roeder, Zell 
No to State Bid for Wrigley; Trib Chief Not Sold on Maverick Financing Deal, CHI. SUN 
TIMES, May 13, 2008, at 3. 
20 McIntyre, supra note 1. 
21 Ameet Sachdev & Michael Oneal, Meet the Cubs’ $900 Million Man, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 23, 2009, at C1. 
22 See, e.g., Theo Francis, ESOP Fables: Employee Control Has Downsides, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at B9; Theo Francis, Tribune Highlights Perils of Employee 
Ownership, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2007, at B4; Tami Luhby, ESOP is Key to Making 
Tribune Deal Work, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2007, at A44; Michael Oneal, Tribune Offers Big 
Payday or Mayday, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 2007, at C1; Allan Sloan, Tribune Deal Makes 
Zell Ace of Tax Dodgers, WASH. POST, May 1, 2007, at D2; Louis Uchitelle, Employee 
Owners Don’t Necessarily Have a Say in Management, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at C1.  
23 Chandler et al., supra note 3; Theo Francis, Tribune Highlights Perils of 
Employee Ownership, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2007, at B4; Michael Oneal & Phil 
Rosenthal, Tribune Bidders Ask For New Data; Burkle, Broad Seek Zell Offer’s Details, 
May Try to Top It, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 2007, at C1; Katharine Q. Seelye & Richard 
Siklos, Chicagoan Puts Up $315 Million to Win $8.2 Billion Tribune Co., N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 2007, at A1. 
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acquisition activity next heated up.24 The Tribune transaction also caught the 
eye of legislators. As part of a proposed comprehensive reform of the 
corporate tax system, Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, has offered a provision to increase taxes 
on interests held indirectly through an S ESOP (synthetic equity), such as the 
interest held by Zell.25 
Yet, in spite of the attention now being given to S ESOPs, there has been 
little in-depth analysis of the tax treatment of S ESOPs. Accordingly, the 
purpose of this Article is to analyze the tax consequences of using an 
S ESOP. Specifically, I evaluate whether the use of an S ESOP provides tax 
advantages (and disadvantages) that are not generally available with other 
transactional structures. I also quantify those advantages (and disadvantages) 
when they arise. Finally, I apply those insights to the Zell Tribune transaction 
and estimate the likely tax savings and the increase in bid price that can be 
attributed to tax savings from the structure.  
II. WHAT IS AN ESOP? 
Broadly speaking, an ESOP is a type of defined contribution employee 
benefit plan. As with other defined contribution plans—such as 401(k), 
403(a), and 403(b) plans—the employer makes contributions on behalf of its 
employees.26 Employees sometimes also contribute. In contrast with defined 
benefit plans, employees with a defined contribution plan are not provided 
with a guaranteed benefit, such as a pension for the rest of their lives.27 
Instead, they are entitled to receive either the actual securities they have in 
their accounts or the market value of those securities.28 
With an ESOP, the sponsoring company sets up a trust for the principal 
purpose of acquiring and holding the sponsor’s securities for the benefit of its 
employees. The ESOP thus provides participants with an ownership interest 
in their employer. Proponents of employee ownership emphasize the 
incentive and team-building advantages of paying employees in part with 
employer stock.29 Critics argue that concentrating employees’ financial 
resources in their employer’s securities increases their exposure to their 
employer’s fortunes.30 That debate, between the advantages of more closely 
aligned incentives and the disadvantages of increased concentration of 
                                                                                                                   
24 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8; Nat’l. Ctr. For Employee Ownership, Coming 
Things That Never Came, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP REP, July–Aug. 2008, at 15. Some 
commentators argued that Zell’s control rights are weaker than in a typical buyout and so 
other acquires might not follow. McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8. Other commentators 
disputed the claim that Zell lacks sufficient control. Id. 
25 Tax Reduction Reform Act, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3701 (2007). 
26 BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 814 § I(A)(2)(b)(5) (2008).  
27 BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 814 § I(A)(2) (2008). 
28 Corey Rosen, How ESOPs Work, in S CORPORATION ESOPS 7–8 (Scott Rodrick 
ed., 2d ed. 2005).  
29 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6, at 7.  
30 Id. at 9.  
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investments,  31 has been the central issue in the debate over ESOPs in 
particular, and employee ownership in general, for many years.32  
ESOPs can be used to achieve a range of purposes. The most common 
use of an ESOP is to purchase the shares of a closely held company from a 
departing owner.33 In such circumstances, an ESOP is a way for the 
departing owner to cash out, maintain control of the company for a period of 
time, and arrange for succession.34 ESOPs can also be used to provide 
employees with stock-based compensation so as to better align their interests 
with those of the stockholders. Other uses include divesting or acquiring 
subsidiaries, buying back publicly held shares (especially as a takeover 
defense), and restructuring benefit plans.35 
ESOPs are authorized and regulated by the Employee Retirement Income 
and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Among the requirements that an ESOP 
must satisfy are the following:36 
(i) the ESOP must be designed to invest primarily in securities 
of the employer;37 
(ii) contributions cannot exceed statutory maximums;38 
(iii) individual beneficiaries must be able to vote the shares that 
have been allocated to their individual accounts;39 shares 
not yet allocated can be voted by the ESOP trustee;40 
                                                                                                                   
31 In the language of finance, increased concentration raises the level of unique (or 
nonsystematic) risk. Unique risk is risk that can be eliminated through diversification. In 
contrast, systematic risk is that risk that cannot be eliminated by diversification, but can 
only be shifted among owners. Systematic risk is compensated for in the market (through 
a higher return); unique risk is not compensated. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 162 (8th ed. 2006). It is because the market provides 
no compensation for bearing unique risk that some commentators argue employee stock 
ownership is a bad idea. Freeman, supra note 6, at 9. 
32 For a comprehensive and recent survey of the literature on the costs and benefits 
of ESOPs, see Freeman, supra note 6. 
33 Rosen, supra note 28, at 9.  
34 Jeffrey Tomich, ESOPs Have One-for-All Appeal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 
30, 2005, at E1.  
35 For discussions of the various reasons why companies establish ESOPs, see Corey 
Rosen, Things To Do With An ESOP Besides Buying Out the Owner, in THE ESOP 
READER (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 4th ed. 2005); Jared Kaplan et al., ESOPs, 
in BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 354 § I(B) (2008). 
36 For a comprehensive discussion of the various provisions that regulate ESOPs, 
see Kaplan et al., supra note 35. 
37 I.R.C. § 409(l) (2006). 
38 The limit on tax-deductible contributions to defined benefit plans is 25% of 
covered compensation. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2008). 
39 I.R.C. § 409(e) (2006). If directions are not timely received, then the trustee can 
vote these shares. See Rev. Rul. 95-57, 1995-2 C.B. 62. The employees’ right to vote 
their shares applies only to certain key issues. See Rosen, How ESOPs Work, supra note 
28, at 16.  
40 See Kaplan et al, supra note 35, at § II(B)(2). 
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(iv) ESOP participants have the right to diversify their accounts 
once they reach certain age and service benchmarks;  41 
(v) the ESOP must meet certain distribution and vesting 
requirements;  42 
(vi) the trustee is subject to the general fiduciary duties of 
ERISA;  43 
(vii) if the ESOP borrows money, it is subject to a series of 
additional restrictions;  44 
(viii) the employee has the right to put the employer’s securities 
back to the employer at its fair market price if there is not a 
liquid market for the securities;  45 and 
(ix) participation in the ESOP cannot occur on a discriminatory 
basis.46 
If the ESOP meets all of the above requirements, then the parties’ 
transactions with the ESOP are taxed according to a specific set of rules that 
apply to ESOPs.47 Those rules are widely considered to be very attractive 
because they confer various tax benefits on the sponsoring employer and the 
participants that are not otherwise available. However, before discussing the 
tax treatment of ESOP transactions, the next Part gives a simple example of a 
leveraged ESOP. 
III. HOW ESOPS WORK 
The typical ESOP is leveraged. That is to say, it uses borrowed money to 
finance the purchase of the employer’s stock. In a leveraged ESOP, the 
company establishes a trust and the trust borrows money to fund the purchase 
of employer stock.48 Over time, the employer makes contributions to the 
plan and the plan uses that money to repay the principal and interest on the 
                                                                                                                   
41 When employees reach age fifty and have ten years of service, the company must 
give them the option of diversifying twenty-five percent of their account balances or 
withdrawing that amount. I.R.C. § 401(a)(28)(B) (2006). At age sixty, employees can 
have half of their account balances diversified or distributed to them. Id. 
42 For discussions of these provisions, see, for example, Kaplan et al., supra note 35, 
at § II(C), and Scott Rodrick, ESOP Distribution and Diversification Rules, in THE ESOP 
READER 108, 109–11 (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003). 
43 Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). 
44 For a discussion of these provisions, see Kaplan et al., supra note 35, at § II(C).  
45 I.R.C. § 409(h) (2006). 
46 For a brief summary of the participation rules, see Corey Rosen, Questions and 
Answers on Operating an ESOP, in THE ESOP READER 120, 120–21 (Scott Rodrick & 
Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003). 
47 These rules are set forth in I.R.C. § 409 and the accompanying regulations. See 26 
C.F.R. §§ 1.409(p)-1, 1.409-1T (2006). 
48 Typically, the company borrows the money from a lender and relends the money 
to the ESOP. The proceeds of the loan are used to acquire the employer’s stock either 
from the company or from other shareholders. If the stock is acquired from the company, 
the company can use the proceeds in its business for any legitimate purpose. If the stock 
is acquired from investors, they can use the money as they like. The ESOP Association, 
What is a Leveraged ESOP?, http://www.esopassociation.org/about/about_leveraged.asp 
(last visited April 22, 2009).  
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ESOP loan.49 Shares in a leveraged ESOP are initially held in a “suspense 
account.”50 As the loan is repaid, shares are released into the individual 
accounts of plan participants.51 
Consider the following simple example of a leveraged ESOP. E Corp. 
establishes an ESOP and agrees to sell that ESOP 100 shares of E Corp. at a 
price of $10 per share. The ESOP funds the purchase by borrowing $1000 at 
an interest rate of 10 percent, compounded annually. Upon transfer, the 100 
shares are held in a suspense account for the benefit of E Corp.’s covered 
employees. The terms of the loan call for the loan to be repaid in ten equal 
annual installments of $162.75. At the end of the first year, E Corp. 
contributes $162.75 to the ESOP. The ESOP, in turn, pays that same amount 
to the lender. Of that $162.75, $100 is payment of accrued interest and 
$62.75 is repayment of principal. The principal payment of $62.75 reduces 
the outstanding balance of the ESOP loan by 6.27 percent. Accordingly, 6.27 
shares  52 will be released from the suspense account into the accounts of 
individual ESOP participants.53 The contribution from the company to the 
ESOP, the ESOP’s payment of interest and principal, and the number of 
shares released from the suspense account each year are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: A Simple Example of a Leveraged ESOP 
 
Year Contribution Interest Principal Shares 
Released 
1 $162.75 $100 $62.75 6.27 
2 162.75 93.73 69.02 6.90 
3 162.75 86.82 75.92 7.59 
4 162.75 79.23 83.51 8.35 
5 162.75 70.88 91.87 9.19 
6 162.75 61.69 101.05 10.11 
7 162.75 51.59 111.16 11.12 
8 162.75 40.47 122.27 12.23 
9 162.75 28.25 134.50 13.45 
10 162.75 14.80 147.95 14.80 
Total $1627.45 $627.45 $1000.00 100 
 
At the end of year 10, the ESOP loan has been repaid and 100 shares of 
E Corp. stock are in the ESOP accounts of the individual employees. If E 
Corp. has not paid any dividends over the prior ten years, then the shares will 
be the only assets in the ESOP.54 Obviously, the total value of the ESOP 
accounts will depend upon how much each share of E Corp. is worth. If that 
stock has appreciated, the accounts, in aggregate, will be worth more than 
$1000; if it has declined, they will be worth less. 
                                                                                                                   
49 BNA TAX  MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 814 § I(A)(2)(b)(5) (2008). 
50 Id. 
51 The release generally must follow one of two formulae. See Rosen, supra note 46, 
at 122. In either case, because of stock price volatility, the market value of the shares 
released each year will rarely equal the principal repayment on the loan that year.  
52 That is 6.27 percent of the 100 shares in the ESOP’s suspense account. 
53 The example assumes immediate vesting. 
54 The example assumes no diversification of the individual ESOP accounts. 
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IV. A CLOSE LOOK AT THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF USING AN S ESOP 
The ESOP literature frequently extols tax benefits as one of the principal 
advantages of and therefore motivations for using an ESOP.55 In order for 
that claim to have merit, the tax benefits of ESOPs on net—after taking out 
any disadvantages—must be substantially greater than the tax benefits on net 
that can be achieved through feasible alternative transactions. The tax 
consequences of C ESOPs were examined by Myron Scholes and Mark 
Wolfson in 1990,  56 several years before Congress authorized S ESOPs.57 In 
this Article, I examine the tax consequences of S ESOPs.58 Accordingly, in 
this Part, I take a close look at the tax advantages and disadvantages of 
S ESOPs relative to other structures.59 
                                                                                                                   
55 The interested reader should see, e.g., the website of the National Center for 
Employee Ownership, http://www.nceo.org. 
56 Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and 
Corporate Restructuring: Myths and Realities, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1990, at 12. 
57 Congress authorized S ESOPs in 1996, and the provisions became effective on 
January 1, 1998. Rosen, supra note 7, at 5. 
58 The method I use to analyze the tax consequences of the S ESOP structure 
endeavors to make an “apples-to-apples” comparison across all parties. The tax 
consequences of a transaction cannot be understood by just looking at how one party to a 
transaction is taxed. In order to evaluate the tax consequences of a transaction, it is 
important to employ an all-parties perspective. If a tax benefit to one party is offset by a 
tax detriment to another party, then there is no net benefit to the structure. In such cases, 
no party will likely be helped or hurt by the tax treatment. Instead, the parties are likely to 
undo the effect of the tax consequences through the terms of the transaction. It is also 
important to separate the tax and non-tax consequences of a transaction by holding the 
non-tax consequences equal across transactions so as to avoid confounding tax and non-
tax consequences. The method for making accurate tax comparisons was developed by 
Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes, Executive Compensation, Taxes and Incentives, in 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 179, 190–201 (1982). That 
method was introduced to the legal literature by Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of 
Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX NOTES 203 (2004), and David I. Walker, Is Equity 
Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 699 (2004). That method has been 
picked up by various legal scholars and is now part of the regular discourse. See Eric D. 
Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in its Proper 
Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 348 (2006); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage 
to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1077 (2008); Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of 
Deferred Compensation, 62 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279455.  
59 Some proponents of ESOPs argue that the tax benefits to S ESOPs are less 
generous than those granted to C ESOPs because the seller of shares to an S ESOP cannot 
take advantage of I.R.C. § 1042. See, e.g., Corey Rosen, ESOPs in S corporations, in THE 
ESOP READER 38, 40–41 (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003). Section 1042 
allows the seller of shares to an ESOP to defer paying tax on the gain from those shares if 
all of the following conditions are met: (i) the company is a closely held C corporation; 
(ii) the seller held her shares for three years or longer; (iii) after the sale, the ESOP holds 
30 percent or more of the employer’s stock; and (iv) the seller’s reinvest the funds in 
qualified replacement securities, essentially stocks and bonds of domestic corporations 
without too much passive income. I.R.C. § 1042(a)–(c) (2006). If the seller satisfies all of 
those conditions, then the seller can defer her capital gain tax until she sells the 
replacement securities. By its own terms, Section 1042 does not apply to sales to S 
ESOPs. See I.R.C. § 1042(c)(1)(A) (limiting scope of exclusion to employer securities 
 
2009] ZELL, TRIBUNE AND S ESOP 527
 
A. Tax Advantages: Claims and Responses 
 Commentators and ESOP promoters regularly claim that there are 
substantial tax benefits from using an S ESOP.60 They generally make two 
claims. First, they claim that the ESOP structure allows the employer to 
deduct repayment of principal on loans incurred by the ESOP.61 Because 
contributions to an ESOP are deductible, an employer that establishes a 
leveraged ESOP—an ESOP that borrows funds to purchase employer 
securities—can deduct repayment of principal.62 In contrast, in other 
situations—including leveraged buyouts—repayment of loan principal is not 
deductible.63 Second, ESOP proponents regularly claim that the use of an 
S ESOP allows participants to defer tax on their income received through the 
ESOP.64 Both claims are usually made in a manner that suggests that such 
benefits are, if not unique to the ESOP structure, sufficiently rare to warrant 
attention.65 
1. Deduction of Principal 
Subject to limitations on amount, payments made by an employer to an 
S ESOP are deductible by the employer.66 Because those contributions 
usually go to pay interest and principal on the ESOP loan, the employer can, 
                                                                                                                   
“issued by a domestic C corporation”). The claim that C ESOP tax benefits are more 
generous than S ESOP benefits has some merit. The ability to defer tax on the sale if the 
proceeds are invested in qualified securities is valuable. In the extreme, if the qualified 
securities are held until death, the seller of shares to the ESOP can permanently avoid the 
entire tax on the gain from those shares. Moreover, although there are some techniques 
that have traditionally been used to transfer the economic interest from owning an asset 
without triggering immediate taxation, and so would enable sellers to obtain in essence 
the tax benefit afforded by Section 1042 without using that provision, such 
“monetization” techniques have been sharply curtailed by the law. I.R.C. § 1259 
(constructing sale rules). Thus, the tax benefit afforded sellers to a C ESOP cannot 
readily be replicated by sellers who do not meet the requirement of that provision. 
  60 Rosen, supra note 46, at 134.  
  61 Id.  
  62 Rosen, supra note 28, at 7–8; David Ackerman, Legal Considerations for 
S corporation ESOPs, in S CORPORATION ESOPS 27, 33–35 (Scott Rodrick ed., 2d ed. 
2005); Chandler et al., supra note 3; Ashley M. Heher, Tribune Accepts Buyout Offer 
From Zell, Plans to Sell Cubs, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 3, 2007, at B7; Mary Lynn F. Jones, 
Employee Ownership Plans Offer Risks, Rewards, PRESSTIME, May 2007, at 20; Tami 
Luhby, ESOP Is Key to Making Tribune Deal Work, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2007, at A44; 
Thomas S. Mulligan, How Zell’s Offer for Tribune Might Work, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2007, at C1. 
63 A related claim that is sometimes made with respect to S ESOPs is that when the 
ESOP owns 100 percent of the company’s stock that no portion of the company’s income 
is taxable. See, e.g., Editorial, ESOP Expectation and Reality, CRAIN’S, Apr. 16, 2007, at 
10. 
64 Karen D. Ng, ESOP—The Misunderstood Plan, 26 S.F. ATT’Y 17, Oct.–Nov. 
2000.  
65 See Rosen, supra note 16 (describing unique tax advantages of S ESOP structure). 
66 The maximum amount that employers can generally deduct for contributions to an 
ESOP is 25 percent of total employee compensation. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3) (Supp. 2008). 
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in effect, deduct both interest and principal on itS ESOP loans.67 The ability 
to deduct principal is often described as a major tax benefit available only to 
employers who adopt an ESOP.68 
Start with the employer. Returning to the example, the employer deducts 
the payment it makes each year to the S ESOP on behalf of its participants. 
Thus, the employer would deduct the amount contained in the column 
labeled “contribution” each year. That is to say, the employer would deduct 
$162.75 each year for 10 years. For shareholders in the 35 percent tax 
bracket, the deduction reduces taxes by $56.96 each year. Thus, over ten 
years, the deductions reduce the shareholders’ taxes by $569.61. 
Although interest payments in commercial settings are usually 
deductible, principal payments are almost never deductible. Specifically, the 
repayment of principal on a loan incurred in a leveraged buyout is not 
deductible. Thus, if the employer borrowed the funds itself, then only the 
interest payments would be deductible. In terms of the example, the 
employer deducts $100 in year 1 and $627.45 over ten years. At a tax rate of 
35 percent, the interest deductions reduce the borrower’s taxes by $219.61 
over ten years. Thus, over the ten-year loan term, the ESOP loan generates 
tax savings of $569.61, whereas the corporate loan reduces taxes by only 
$219.61. The difference—$350—is one advantage of using an S ESOP. 
Thus, it is often claimed that a major advantage of using an ESOP is that the 
principal payments on the ESOP loan are, in effect, deductible.69 
That argument, however, is wrong. The flaw in that argument was first 
described by Scholes and Wolfson in 1990 in the context of C ESOPs.70 
Contributions to C ESOPs, they pointed out, are not unusual in being 
deductible.71 Contributions to other pension plans are also deductible, as are 
other compensation payments, including straight salary.72 With only minor 
exceptions, none of which is relevant here,73 all compensation paid to 
employees is deductible by the employer.74 Moreover, payments made by a 
corporation to an ESOP—whether a C ESOP or an S ESOP—benefit only 
the ESOP’s participants, and not other equity holders. Thus, contributions 
that are used to repay principal on an ESOP loan are, in effect, compensation 
                                                                                                                   
67 With a C ESOP, contributions that go to pay principal on an ESOP loan do not 
count against the 25 percent limit. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2008). Instead, for such 
contributions, there is an additional 25 percent limit for contributions that go to pay 
principal. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(A) (Supp. 2008). Contributions that go to pay interest on the 
C corporation’s ESOP loan are not limited. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(B). For S ESOPs, there are 
no increased limits. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(C). Instead, for S ESOPs, contributions that go to 
pay for principal and/or interest on the ESOP loan count against the general 25 percent 
limit. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(C) (2000). 
68 See Corey Rosen, An Overview of ESOPs, in THE ESOP READER 1, 3 (Scott 
Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003).  
69 Scholes & Wolfson, supra note 56, at 22. 
70 Id. at 16.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 For example, the $1 million limit on executive compensation under I.R.C. 
§ 162(m) (2006). 
74 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2000).  
 
2009] ZELL, TRIBUNE AND S ESOP 529
 
paid to those participants and so are properly deducted by the employer who 
makes them.75  
The above argument applies with equal force whether an ESOP is owned 
by a C corporation or an S corporation. Of course, an S ESOP might own 100 
percent of a company, in which case no one gets the deduction.76 More 
generally, if an S ESOP owns a fraction of the company, say 30 percent, then 
the holders of the rest of the stock (70 percent of shares held outside of the 
ESOP) will have passed through to them 70 percent of the corporation’s net 
income after payment of all expenses, including compensation. Treating cash 
payments made to an S ESOP as expenses—whether used to repay principal 
on a loan or otherwise—ensures that the remaining shareholders have 
apportioned to them their share of the corporation’s income, and neither 
more nor less than that amount. There is nothing special or unusual about the 
deduction. Indeed, what would be extraordinary would be to deny that 
deduction.  
In effect, the deduction for ESOP contributions ensures that there is only 
one level of tax with an S ESOP. Although one level of tax is generally better 
than two, one level of tax is not unique to businesses that use an S ESOP. 
There are numerous ways to achieve one level of tax. First, one can use a 
pass-through entity. For example, by organizing a business as a sole 
proprietorship or by using an S corporation, a partnership, or a limited 
liability company (LLC), the owners of the business can avoid the corporate 
tax and subject themselves to only one level of taxation.77 In other words, an 
S corporation without an S ESOP will also avoid a second level of tax. 
Second, leverage can be used to achieve a single level of taxation when the 
business is held through a C corporation.78 Because interest is deductible 
from the income of the corporate payor, whereas dividends and redemptions 
are not, leverage reduces exposure to the corporate tax.79 Many companies 
have a high debt-to-equity ratio as a means to reduce corporate tax by 
stripping interest income out from a corporation through interest payments.80 
It therefore follows that the claim that the ability to deduct principal 
payments on the ESOP loan is a substantial advantage of establishing an 
S ESOP is without merit. A company with an S ESOP is subject to one level 
                                                                                                                   
75 Scholes & Wolfson, supra note 56, at 16. 
76 The majority of S ESOPs own 100 percent of their sponsoring company. COREY 
ROSEN, NATL. CTR. FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, RETIREMENT SECURITY AND WEALTH 
ACCUMULATION IN S ESOP COMPANIES 14 (2005), available at 
http://esca.us/documents/NCEO_STUDY.pdf.  
77 I.R.C. § 11 (2006) (imposing a tax on corporations). 
78 See I.R.C. § 163(a) (making interest deductible). 
79 BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 472–76. 
80 One advantage of using a pass-through entity rather than debt to provide a single 
level of taxation is that the pass-through entity ensures one level of tax. The business 
might not support a capital structure made up almost entirely of debt. There is substantial 
finance literature that shows that risky and intangible assets cannot support as much debt 
as less risky and tangible assets. See, e.g., RONALD W. MASULIS, THE DEBT/EQUITY 
CHOICE 90 (1988), Michael Bradley et al., On the Existence of an Optimal Capital 
Structure: Theory and Evidence, 39 J. FIN. 857, 873–74 (1984); Michael S. Knoll, Taxing 
Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and Risk-
Taking, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1491–94, 1495 (1993). 
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of taxation and there are numerous structures that subject the income 
generated by a business to only one level of tax.81 That brings us to the 
second claimed tax benefit from using an S ESOP.82 
2. Deferral of Income 
From the perspective of the participants, an S ESOP is an example of a 
qualified account. The beneficiary of a qualified account is not taxed on 
contributions made to that account;83 she is also not taxed on the 
contribution or investment gains and losses during the life of the account; she 
is, however, taxed at ordinary income tax rates on the value of the assets 
withdrawn from her account.84 As a result, because S ESOPs are qualified 
accounts, participants can defer tax on their account balances as long as they 
continue to hold those assets through the S ESOP. However, when 
participants withdraw assets from their S ESOP accounts, they pay taxes at 
ordinary income tax rates, not at capital gains rates. The deferrals of tax on 
the contribution, appreciation, and dividends are widely acknowledged to be 
tax advantages from using an S ESOP.85 
                                                                                                                  
The deferral of tax on income earned through an S ESOP is an attractive 
feature of using an S ESOP, but it is not unique to S ESOPs. An ESOP is an 
example of a qualified account. Taxpayers with qualified accounts can 
deduct their contributions to such accounts; when they make withdrawals 
from their accounts they include the amounts withdrawn in income at 
 
81 Some proponents of S ESOPs claim that the tax benefits afforded S ESOPs are 
less generous than those afforded C ESOPs because dividends paid to a C ESOP are 
deductible by the payor provided that the dividends are either: (1) paid in cash; (2) 
reinvested in employer securities; or (3) used to repay an ESOP loan. Rosen, supra note 
7, at 3; I.R.C. § 404(k) (2006). Because dividends, including dividends paid to S ESOPs, 
are not deductible, the treatment of C ESOPs is said to be more favorable than the 
treatment of S ESOPs. Rosen, supra note 7, at 3. That claim is questionable. The reason 
why is that the § 404(a)(9) deduction for dividends paid to an ESOP offsets what would 
otherwise be corporate level tax on the income that is used to pay the dividend. 
Ackerman, supra note 62, at 31. C corporations are subject to two levels of tax and the 
effect of the deduction is to reduce the tax on such income to one level of tax that is 
collected when the individual withdraws the funds. Id. That is the same treatment as 
occurs with an S ESOP without the deduction. If there was a deduction for dividends paid 
to an ESOP by an S corporation, then that deduction would offset other income and 
provide even better treatment. For example, if the deduction were allocated to the ESOP 
participant, then such dividend in effect would forever escape tax. Alternatively, if it 
were allocated to other owners, then they would escape tax on part of their income. 
82 Moreover, because there are no tax consequences to parties other than the 
participants from the decision to use an ESOP—that is true for both S and C ESOPs 
(except for the Section 1042 deferral granted to some sellers to C ESOPs)—the tax 
consequences of the decision to use an S ESOP can be ascertained by looking solely at 
the participants.  
83 If the contribution is made by the beneficiary out of assets that either will be taxed 
or already have been taxed, such as with cash contributions into an individual retirement 
account, then the contribution is deductible. See I.R.C. § 219(a) (granting individual 
taxpayers deductions for their qualified retirement contributions). 
84 I.R.C. § 402(a) (2006). 
85 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 62, at 34.  
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ordinary rates.86 Also, the limits on qualified accounts are for the total 
amount contributed to all accounts; the limits are not separate for each type 
of account.87 Moreover, the limit, 25 percent of income,88 is generally more 
than most employees contribute,89 and so for most employees the limit is not 
binding. Thus, for most employers, an ESOP is a substitute for other 
qualified accounts.  
B. Tax Disadvantages: An Old Claim, a Response, and a New Claim  
In this section, I discuss two possible disadvantages from using an 
S ESOP. The first—which has been pointed out by others—is questionable; 
the second—which to my knowledge has not been recognized previously—
exists and can arise frequently. 
1. A Higher Tax Rate on Gains 
Commentators sometimes claim that the higher ordinary income tax rate 
that applies to withdrawals from an ESOP is a disadvantage of investing 
through an ESOP.90 The argument goes as follows: when holding the stock 
directly would produce long-term capital gain, then the higher ordinary 
income tax rate paid on that income is a tax disadvantage of using an 
ESOP.91 
That simple and intuitive argument, however, is mistaken because it is 
incomplete. In order to be taxed at long-term capital gains rates on the 
appreciation in the stock, the stock must be held by the employee directly 
and not in a qualified account.92 That, in turn, requires that the employer pay 
the employee a salary and the employee purchase the stock.93 In that case, 
the employee will have taxable income when paid. In contrast, with an 
ESOP, the employee does not have taxable income when the contributions 
are made.94 Instead, the participant is taxed only when funds are withdrawn 
from the account.95 As is well-known in the tax literature, the effect of 
deferring tax on a sum is equivalent to exempting the return on that sum from 
                                                                                                                   
86 Rosen, supra note 28, at 20.  
87 I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
88 Id. 
89 See Freeman, supra note 6, at 6; ROSEN, RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 76, at 
5 (“Typical U.S. company contribution plans . . . fall in the range of 2% to 3% of eligible 
pay.”).  
90 See Rosen, supra note 68, at 12. 
91 Although I assume throughout this Article in making my calculations that S ESOP 
participants would be taxed at 35 percent—the top ordinary rate—many S ESOP 
participants are likely taxed at lower rates. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(14), 409(a)(1), 414(q) 
(2006).  
92 Withdrawals from qualified accounts, of which ESOPs are a species, are taxed at 
ordinary income tax rates. See I.R.C. § 1042. 
93 The stock, then, is a capital asset. See I.R.C. § 1221. Its sale thus produces a 
capital gain, or loss. I.R.C. § 1222. 
94 In both instances, the employer has a deduction when the contribution is made so 
there is no employer side difference. 
95 Rosen, supra note 68, at 14–15. 
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tax until the end of the deferral period.96 Thus, the effect of investing 
through an ESOP—or another qualified account—is to exempt the return on 
the assets from taxation for as long as they are in the ESOP. From an 
economic standpoint, the return on those assets while held through the ESOP 
is not taxed at 35 percent upon withdrawal, but is effectively untaxed. 
Exemption is obviously more attractive than being subject to tax (albeit 
deferred) at a 15 percent tax rate. 
                                                                                                                  
2. Borrowing Without an Interest Deduction 
As described above, an ESOP is an attractive saving vehicle because it 
defers taxation on the funds held through the ESOP. With an ESOP, taxation 
of the beneficiary on both the contribution and the return on that contribution 
are deferred until the beneficiary withdraws the funds. The effect of such 
deferral is the economic equivalent of taxing beneficiaries on their 
employers’ contributions at ordinary income tax rates when earned and 
exempting the return on those contributions from tax for as long as those 
amounts are held in ESOP accounts. That equivalence also implies that the 
borrower, in effect, loses the interest deduction when borrowing through an 
ESOP. 
Viewing the ESOP loan from the employee’s perspective, the employer 
has agreed to make cash contributions to an ESOP for the employee’s 
benefit. The employee, rather than waiting to receive the employer’s 
contributions before acquiring the employer’s stock, borrows through the 
ESOP and purchases the stock right away. The employers’ subsequent 
contributions, instead of going to purchase shares of the employers’ stock, 
pay principal and interest on the ESOP loan. Because the appreciation on the 
balance in an ESOP account is effectively untaxed, that exemption applies to 
both the income earned on the ESOP’s assets and the interest paid on the 
ESOP loan.97 In other words, the interest paid by the employee on the ESOP 
loan is not deductible. That, in turn, implies that the tax benefit of an ESOP 
is that the net return for the duration of the ESOP on the funds contributed to 
through the ESOP escapes tax.98 
 
96 See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in 
INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HASEN 300, 
302–14 (1948), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS’N, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
TAXATION 525–37 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959); William O. 
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash-Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1113, 1123–26 (1974). The equivalence result assumes that the tax rate is the same when 
the contribution is made and when the account is liquidated. 
97 Between contributions, the employee’s account balance is reduced by interest 
accruing on the ESOP loan. 
98 The interest on the ESOP loan is also not deductible when the loan is viewed from 
the employer’s perspective. With an ESOP, the employer deducts its contributions to the 
ESOP when they are made. Those payments pay principal and interest. Deferring the 
employer’s deduction until payment is equivalent to providing the employer with an 
upfront deduction for its contribution (principal) and not allowing a subsequent deduction 
for the increased contribution (interest). 
 
2009] ZELL, TRIBUNE AND S ESOP 533
 
C. A Fairly Simple Example of the Tax Benefits of Using an S ESOP 
The tax advantage from using an S ESOP can be illustrated using the 
example from Part III.99 Although E Corp.’S ESOP holds 100 shares, the 
interests of the ESOP participants in their employer’s securities is not the 
same as if they held 100 shares on personal account. Since the participants 
pay tax at ordinary income tax rates on any assets withdrawn from the ESOP, 
the government in effect owns 35 percent of the assets in the ESOP. Because 
the only assets in the ESOP are 100 shares of the employer’s stock, the 
government’s claim is, in effect, a claim to thirty-five shares. Thus, the 
S ESOP participants are the economic owners of sixty-five shares of their 
employer’s stock. Moreover, the participants are entitled to receive their 
sixty-five shares free of taxes and with a basis equal to their fair market value 
when they withdraw their shares—or an equivalent amount of cash—from 
the ESOP.100 Thus, any appreciation on those sixty-five shares that occurs 
while they are within the ESOP is never taxed. 
It follows from above that the tax benefit to the participants from using 
an ESOP (rather than holding their shares directly) depends upon how the 
participants would be taxed if they held their shares directly. There are two 
polar cases to consider. The tax burden on direct ownership of the 
S corporation is generally at its lowest when the income is deferred and taxed 
as capital gain upon sale (case 1). The tax burden on direct ownership is 
generally at its highest when the income is taxed currently as ordinary 
income (case 2).101 
1. Income from Direct Ownership is Deferred Capital Gain (Case 1) 
Assume that all of the income from direct ownership would be deferred 
and taxed at 15 percent as long-term capital gain upon sale.102 In order to 
evaluate the tax consequences of the S ESOP structure, consider an otherwise 
similar group of employees who do not participate in the ESOP, but instead 
acquire an economically equivalent interest directly.103 Accordingly, in order 
to have the same exposure to their employer’s stock as do the ESOP 
participants, the nonparticipants would have to purchase 76.47 shares at a 
                                                                                                                   
99 This simple example does not take into account the disadvantage from borrowing 
through an ESOP. That disadvantage is introduced later in Part IV.B, infra. 
100 An S ESOP will usually distribute cash, not employer securities, because the sale 
of any stock of an S corporation to a disqualified person will disqualify the corporation’s 
S election and subject the corporation to corporate tax. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (setting 
forth requirements to be an S corporation). 
101 It is possible for a corporation to generate large amounts of income for several 
years followed by a large capital loss. In such circumstances, the tax burden on direct 
ownership exceeds the statutory tax rate. I ignore such possibilities below. 
102 I.R.C. § 1222 (2006). 
103 In order to qualify as an ESOP, the trust must cover most employees. See I.R.C. 
§§ 401(a)(3), 410 (2006). I use the possibility of nonparticipants synthesizing an interest 
in the ESOP as a heuristic device in order to describe the tax impact of using an S ESOP. 
In such a comparison, I ignore any difference in the vesting of shares over time. 
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cost of $764.71.104 The nonparticipants do not have to purchase as many 
shares as are in the ESOP—100 shares—because they will receive 85 
percent, instead of only 65 percent, on any subsequent appreciation or 
depreciation.105 In order to pay for their shares, assume that the 
nonparticipants borrow $764.71. 
Because the nonparticipating employees do not benefit from 
contributions to the ESOP, they will receive additional salary of $162.75 a 
year for ten years. The present value of that salary (discounted at 10 percent) 
is $1000. Because the salary is taxable at 35 percent, the nonparticipants will 
pay $350 in taxes, leaving them with $650. In other words, the additional 
salary payments to the nonparticipants are sufficient after tax to pay the 
principal and interest on a $650 loan.106 I call that $650 loan the “base loan.” 
The base loan covers the cost of acquiring the after-tax shares held by the 
participating employees. Thus, the nonparticipants’ total loan exceeds the 
base loan by $114.71. I call that difference the “incremental loan.” Thus, the 
nonparticipating employees will have to pay $114.71 plus accrued interest 
when they sell their shares (which is assumed to occur on the same date as 
the participating employees withdraw and sell their shares).107 In terms of 
the example, the ESOP loan is $1000, the nonparticipant’s base loan is $650, 
their incremental loan is $114.71, and so the nonparticipants’ total loan is 
$764.71 
Unlike the participating employees, the nonparticipating employees have 
basis in their shares. Their aggregate basis is $764.71. Because that basis 
offsets capital gain, which is otherwise taxable at 15 percent, that basis 
provides a tax savings of exactly $114.71.108 Thus, the nonparticipating 
employees’ tax savings from their basis in their shares will exactly pay off 
the principal on the incremental loan. However, the nonparticipating 
employees also have to pay interest on that loan. In the example, interest 
accrues at 10 percent from the date the ESOP is established until the shares 
are withdrawn and sold. The interest on the incremental loan totals $11.47 in 
the first year109 and increases by 10 percent each year.110 
                                                                                                                   
104 Thus, in order to have the same exposure as holding sixty-five shares that are 
untaxed, an investor who will be taxed at the 15 percent capital gains rate must purchase 
76.47 (65 / (1 - .15)) shares. At a price of $10 a share, the total cost of such a purchase is 
$764.71. 
105 See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. 
106 The calculations in the text assume that the interest on the loan to the 
nonparticipating employee is not tax deductible. That assumption takes out the possibility 
of tax arbitrage by borrowing and investing in a tax-advantaged investment. If allowance 
were made for such a possibility, then the tax advantage from using an S ESOP would be 
smaller (and possibly a disadvantage). See discussion infra note 122 and accompanying 
text. 
107 The nonparticipating employees will sell 76.47 shares. Thus, every dollar 
increase in the stock price will generate an additional $76.47. Because that gain is taxed 
as long-term capital gain at the 15 percent tax rate, the employees will pay $11.47 in tax 
for each dollar increase. Thus, the nonparticipating employees will receive $65 for every 
dollar increase in stock price, as do the participating employees. 
108 That is to say, 15 percent of $764.71 is $114.71. 
109 If the interest is tax deductible, then the after-tax cost is 6.5 percent a year; if not, 
that cost is 10 percent a year. The possibility of deducting interest on the loan outside of 
the ESOP is discussed below. See infra Part IV.D.3. 
 
2009] ZELL, TRIBUNE AND S ESOP 535
 
2. Income from Ownership is Taxed Currently as Ordinary Income (Case 2) 
The second polar case assumes that direct ownership would generate 
only current ordinary income. In that case, the nonparticipating employees 
would have to acquire 100 shares in order to have the same exposure as 
participating employees with 100 shares in the S ESOP. The nonparticipants 
need to purchase 100 shares because all of their income is ordinary—taxed at 
35 percent—and so holding 100 shares leaves the nonparticipants with an 
after-tax return equal to the before-tax return on 100 shares held through an 
ESOP. The cost of such shares is $1000.111 As above, the salary will cover 
principal and interest on the base loan, which covers the cost of purchasing 
65 shares.112 Thus, to match the participants’ exposure, the nonparticipants 
must purchase an additional 35 shares for $350. When the nonparticipants 
sell their stock and repay the incremental loan, they will pay $350 principal 
on that loan. The nonparticipating employees also have $1000 basis, which 
translates into a tax savings of $350. That tax savings pays off the principal 
on the incremental loan. Thus, one cost of direct ownership in an 
S corporation, rather than ownership through that corporation’S ESOP, is the 
after-tax interest paid by the nonparticipant on the incremental loan—$350 in 
the example. 
When the S corporation produces current ordinary income, direct 
ownership has a second tax cost. Because the S corporation produces current 
income—as opposed to deferred income—the holder of a direct interest has 
to pay taxes as the S corporation earns income. In contrast, the holder of an 
interest through an ESOP can defer tax on that income generated by an 
S corporation. The advantage of such deferral is that the interest on the 
income generated by the S corporation can be reinvested and allowed to 
compound before paying the tax on that income. Thus, the funds that a direct 
owner would otherwise use to pay tax can be reinvested to generate income, 
some portion of which the taxpayer will keep. It is the interest that the ESOP 
participant earns and keeps on the funds that the nonparticipant would 
otherwise use to pay taxes that is the second cost of direct ownership.  
D. Estimating the Tax Benefits of Using S ESOPs 
In this section, I generalize the above results. This exercise will allow the 
reader to estimate the tax benefits to the participants from using an S ESOP 
instead of making a direct investment in an S corporation. Denote the 
personal tax rate by tp, the capital gains tax rate by tcg, the annual risk-free 
interest rate by r, and the time from establishment and funding of the ESOP 
                                                                                                                   
110 The situation here is analogous to the decision whether to make the I.R.C. 
§ 83(b) election for restricted stock. The ESOP is equivalent to the treatment of restricted 
stock under I.R.C. § 83(a). The alternative structure is equivalent to the treatment after 
making the I.R.C. § 83(b) election. 
111 Thus, to get the same exposure as holding 100 shares that are untaxed, an 
investor who will be taxed at the 35 percent ordinary income tax rate purchases 100 (65 / 
(1 - .35)) shares. At a price of $10 a share, the total cost is $1000. 
112 Once again, that calculation assumes that the interest on the loan to the 
nonparticipating employee is not deductible. 
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until the assets are withdrawn and taxed by n. Also, denote the purchase price 
of the employer’s stock at the date the ESOP is established by P0. 
1. Income from Direct Ownership is Deferred Capital Gain (Case 1) 
 In this section, I derive a formula for the cost to an employee of 
holding one share of the employer’s stock directly, rather than holding an 
equivalent economic interest through an S ESOP. I show that the effect of 
holding one share of the S corporation directly rather than indirectly through 
an S ESOP is that the direct investor is, in effect, tying up [(1- tp) tcg / (1- tcg 
)]P0 dollars for each share held in the S ESOP. 
The derivation starts with the observation that an employee who holds 
one share of her employer’s stock directly does not have the same exposure 
to her employer’s stock as an employee who holds one share through an 
S ESOP. The former gains $ (1– tcg) for every dollar increase in price, 
whereas the latter gains $(1– tp). Thus, holding one share directly rather than 
through an S ESOP increases the holder’s economic exposure to her 
employer’s stock by (tp– tcg) shares from (1– tp) shares to (1 – tcg) shares. 
Accordingly, in order for a direct holder to have the same exposure as a 
holder of one share through an S ESOP, the direct holder must hold (1– tp) / 
(1– tcg) shares.  
The holder of shares through an S ESOP is assumed to finance her 
purchase using an ESOP loan. The loan, in turn, is paid off through 
contributions by the employer. Assume that the nonparticipating employee 
borrows on personal account to acquire her shares. Of course, if the 
employee does not participate in the ESOP, there is no reason for the 
employer to make contributions to the ESOP on her behalf. Instead, assume 
the equivalent amount is paid directly to the employee as salary. After paying 
taxes, the additional salary can carry and repay the base loan—the cost of 
purchasing (1– tp) shares.113 It, therefore, follows that the incremental loan 
covers the cost of acquiring (1– tp) tcg / (1– tcg) shares. That additional loan 
puts the direct investor and the ESOP participant on the same cash flow 
footing at the beginning of the transaction. By comparing the cash flow when 
the ESOP participant withdraws and sells stock to the cash flow when the 
nonparticipant sells stock,  114 it is possible to compare the two alternatives. 
Because the additional basis that the direct holder has from acquiring (1 – tp) 
/ (1 – tcg) shares on personal account is worth [(1– tp) tcg / (1– tcg)] P0 when 
the shares are sold, that saving will exactly pay off the principal of the direct 
stockholder’s incremental loan (the loan to acquire the additional (1– tp) tcg / 
(1– tcg) shares not covered by the base loan). Thus, the tax benefit to the 
participant from using an S ESOP instead of directly holding shares in the 
S corporation is the after-tax interest that the direct holder would pay on the 
incremental loan. If we denote the accrued interest on $1 over the ESOP term 
by (1+r)n–1, then the tax benefit from using the S ESOP is [(1– tp) tcg / (1– 
                                                                                                                   
113 That assumes that interest on the nonparticipating employee’s loan is never 
deducted. Alternatively, it assumes that the nonparticipating employee would earn 
taxable interest on those funds if she did not use them to buy shares of her employer’s 
stock. That is to say, she would otherwise invest those funds through a qualified account. 
114 I assume that the nonparticipant sells the stock on the same day that the 
participant withdraws cash from the ESOP. 
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tcg)] P0 [(1+r)n–1]. Reducing that amount to a present value at the time the 
S ESOP is funded115 implies that the tax benefit to a participant from using 
an S ESOP compared with holding shares in the S corporation directly and 
being paid additional taxable salary, B, can be written as follows: 
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It follows from equation (1) that the holder is better off with an S ESOP 
whenever tax rates are positive and the interest rate is positive. Moreover, 
that benefit will increase as the holding period increases.116 
Most of the terms in equation (1) are already known. The personal (tp) 
and capital gains (tcg) tax rates are 35 percent and 15 percent, respectively. I 
use an annual before-tax interest rate of 3.7 percent for the calculations.117 
Thus, the present values of the tax saving from using an S ESOP, expressed 
both in dollars for a $1000 grant and as a percent of the total grant, are given 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Tax Benefit of Using an S ESOP Over Direct Ownership (Assumes 
Income from Direct Ownership is Deferred Capital Gain) (As a function of time to 
withdrawal from the ESOP) 
 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 
% Grant 0.41% 0.80% 1.18% 1.55% 1.91% 
Dollars $4.09 $8.04 $11.85 $15.52 $19.05 
 
Years 6 7 8 9 10 
% Grant 2.25% 2.58% 2.89% 3.20% 3.49% 
Dollars $22.47 $25.76 $28.93 $31.99 $34.94 
 
Years 12 15 20 25 30 
% Grant 4.05% 4.82% 5.92% 6.85% 7.61% 
Dollars $40.53 $48.19 $59.24 $68.46 $76.14 
 
The entries in Table 2 represent the tax saving from using an S ESOP 
over direct ownership in the S corporation. Those numbers can also be used 
to estimate the increase in an acquirer’s possible bid price that is a result of 
the tax benefits of using an S ESOP. In the case of a firm that is 100 percent 
owned by an S ESOP, the numbers in Table 2 represent the percentage 
                                                                                                                   
115 The present value as of the beginning of the ESOP of one dollar to be received at 
the end of the ESOP with certainty is $[1/(1+r)n]. 
116 That is because r / (1+r)n increases with the time to withdrawal (n). 
117 I chose a low-risk, one-year interest rate in the range between the higher rates 
prevailing in the middle of 2007, when the Tribune deal was announced, and the lower 
rates prevailing in the middle of 2008, when a working version of this Article was posted 
on SSRN. 
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increase in possible bid price.118 For lesser ownership amounts, the benefit is 
roughly the product of the share of the company held through the ESOP and 
the relevant value in Table 2.119 
2. Income from Direct Ownership is Current Ordinary Income  
(Case 2) 
When the income from direct ownership is taxed currently and at 
ordinary income tax rates, the effect of holding shares in the S corporation 
directly rather than through the S ESOP is equivalent to tying up tp shares of 
capital for every share held. That is because holding one share directly has 
the same exposure as holding one share through an S ESOP. Accordingly, 
the nonparticipating employees must hold as many shares as the ESOP 
participants. Thus, the nonparticipating employees must borrow as much as 
the ESOP borrows in order to acquire their shares. Their additional salary, 
after tax, will pay interest and principal on the base loan, which covers the 
cost of (1– tp) shares. Also, the nonparticipating employees’ basis in their 
shares will save them tpP0, which will pay the principal on the incremental 
loan. Hence, the first tax benefit from using an S ESOP is that the ESOP 
participants avoid paying the after-tax interest that the nonparticipating 
employees pay on the incremental loan. 
As described above, the second tax benefit from holding an interest in an 
S corporation through an ESOP when the business generates current income 
is that the holder can reinvest the income generated by the corporation 
without first having to pay tax on that income. The advantage of such 
deferral is that the interest can be reinvested at the before-tax interest rate 
instead of the after-tax interest rate. Assuming that the business generates 
income at a constant rate, the benefit from using an S ESOP, B, can be 
written as:  
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The first term in equation (2) is the effect of tying up capital in the 
incremental loan. The second—complicated and lengthy—term is the 
difference between compounding interest on the after-tax income generated 
by the S corporation at a before-tax interest rate and at an after-tax interest 
rate. 
Substituting values for the various terms in equation (2), the present 
value from using an S ESOP, rather than directly owning shares in the 
S ESOP, is given in Table 3. 
 
                                                                                                                   
118 The calculation assumes that the same parties will own the company either 
directly or through the S ESOP or, alternatively, that any holders through the S ESOP 
value their interests on the same terms as do outside investors. If the S ESOP holders are 
reluctant participants, then the comparison cannot be made. 
119 I use the qualifier “roughly” because increases in purchase price result in 
increases in basis, which in turn might generate a tax shield that has value to direct 
holders. 
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Table 3: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP over Direct Ownership (As a 
function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct 
ownership is current ordinary income) Before-tax Interest Rate of 3.7 percent 
 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 
% Grant 1.25% 2.45% 3.64% 4.82% 5.98% 
Dollars $12.49 $24.53 $36.42 $48.17 $59.76 
 
Years 6 7 8 9 10 
% Grant 7.12% 8.25% 9.37% 10.47% 11.56% 
Dollars $71.21 $82.52 $93.69 $104.72 $115.61 
  
Years 12 15 20 25 30 
% Grant 13.7% 16.81% 21.73% 26.36% 30.7% 
Dollars $136.99 $168.06 $217.31 $263.56 $307.00 
 
The entries in Table 3 are everywhere larger than those in Table 2. That 
is not surprising. The tax advantage from using an ESOP is greater if the 
income generated by the S corporation would otherwise be taxed currently as 
ordinary income rather than deferred and taxed as capital gain.  
3. Interest Paid on Loan Outside of the ESOP is Tax-Deductible 
The above calculations for the tax benefits of using a leveraged S ESOP 
assumed that the nonparticipating employee who synthesized the 
participating employee’S ESOP position by purchasing shares and borrowing 
on personal account would not be able to deduct her interest payments. That 
assumption has some basis in the law—interest on personal loans is not 
deductible.120 However, my main reason for making that assumption is to 
mirror the tax treatment of the ESOP loan. As described above, an ESOP is a 
tax-efficient investment vehicle because the income earned on assets held in 
an ESOP is exempt from tax as long as the assets remain within the ESOP. It 
is precisely what makes an ESOP an attractive investment vehicle that also 
makes an ESOP an unattractive borrowing vehicle. Interest paid on a loan 
incurred through an ESOP is, in effect, not deductible by the borrower.  
That observation turns the standard (albeit faulty) logic—that an ESOP is 
attractive from a tax standpoint because principal payments can be 
deducted—on its head. It suggests that a leveraged ESOP can be an 
unattractive borrowing vehicle. An ESOP participant who can borrow on 
personal account on the same terms as the ESOP and receive a deduction 
against ordinary income is better off borrowing on personal account. Such a 
taxpayer gets the best of both systems—investing through an ESOP (or other 
qualified account) and borrowing on personal account.121 In some 
circumstances, there are anti-arbitrage provisions that are intended to 
                                                                                                                   
120 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) (2007). 
121 Tax-deductible interest includes business interest, investment interest, and home 
acquisition interest. 
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penalize similar strategies.122 The well-known problem with such rules is 
that money is fungible, which makes them difficult to enforce.123 However, 
even if it is not possible to borrow on personal account and invest through a 
qualified account, it might still be possible to borrow in a manner that 
generates tax-deductible interest and to hold the asset directly. In that case, 
the decision to use a leveraged ESOP involves a trade-off between the tax 
advantage of avoiding tax on the income generated by the assets in the ESOP 
and the tax disadvantage of losing the interest deduction on the ESOP loan. 
Accordingly, in this section, I have calculated the tax benefits from using 
an S ESOP assuming that interest paid on the non-ESOP loan would be 
deductible. That calculation takes place in two steps. In the first, I recalculate 
the tax benefits from an S ESOP over direct ownership assuming that the 
interest from the incremental loan (the amount by which the loan without an 
ESOP exceeds the loan on the participating employee’s after-tax portion of 
the stock with the ESOP) is deductible.124 Those calculations, which are 
made using equation (1) when the S corporation would produce only deferred 
long-term capital gain and equation (2) when it would produce only current 
ordinary income, assume that only the interest on the incremental loan is 
deductible. Accordingly, in the second step, I calculate the additional tax 
savings assuming that the interest on the base loan—which covers the cost of 
acquiring 65 percent of the shares in the ESOP—is also deductible. 
Subtracting the second number from the first gives the tax advantage from 
using an S ESOP assuming all interest paid outside of the ESOP is tax 
deductible. 
After paying taxes at 35 percent, a before-tax interest rate of 3.7 percent 
is equivalent to an after-tax interest rate of 2.4 percent. Thus, the after-tax 
borrowing cost to a nonparticipating employee is 2.4 percent. Setting r in 
equation (1) equal to 2.4 percent gives the present value of the tax advantage 
from the S ESOP assuming that all of the income produced by the 
S corporation is deferred long-term capital gain and the interest on the 
incremental loan—an additional 11.47 percent of shares in the ESOP—is tax 
deductible. The results of such an exercise, which recalculates the entries in 
Table 2 assuming interest on the incremental loan is tax-deductible, are given 
in Table 2A. 
 
                                                                                                                   
122 See I.R.C. § 264(a) (2007) (denying a deduction on loans incurred to pay some 
insurance premiums); I.R.C. § 265(a) (2007) (denying a deduction for interest incurred to 
buy or acquire tax-exempt securities). 
123 The tracing rules are contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a) (1997). 
124 That recalculation is required not because the tax treatment of the ESOP has 
changed—it has not—but because the tax treatment of the counterfactual has changed. 
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Table 2A: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP over Direct Ownership (As a 
function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct 
ownership is deferred capital gain)  
 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 
% Grant 0.27% 0.53% 0.79% 1.04% 1.28% 
Dollars $2.69 $5.31 $7.88 $10.38 $12.83 
 
Years 6 7 8 9 10 
% Grant 1.52% 1.75% 1.98% 2.2% 2.42% 
Dollars $15.21 $17.55 $19.82 $22.05 $24.22 
 
Years 12 15 20 25 30 
% Grant 2.84% 3.43% 4.33% 5.13% 5.84% 
Dollars $28.41 $34.34 $43.32 $51.31 $58.40 
 
Not surprisingly, as a quick comparison of Tables 2 and 2A illustrates, 
the tax benefit of using an S ESOP is smaller when interest on the 
incremental loan is otherwise tax-deductible. 
Similarly, equation (2) gives the tax benefit from using an S ESOP when 
all of the income produced by the S corporation is current ordinary income. 
Setting r in that equation equal to 2.4 percent gives the present value of the 
tax advantage from the S ESOP assuming that the interest on the incremental 
loan—an additional 35 percent of shares in the ESOP—is tax deductible. The 
results, which recalculate the entries in Table 3 assuming interest on the 
incremental loan is tax-deductible, are given in Table 3A. 
 
Table 3A: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP over Direct Ownership (As a 
function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct 
ownership is current ordinary income) 
 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 
% Grant 0.81% 1.58% 2.35% 3.1% 3.84% 
Dollars $8.12 $15.84 $23.47 $31.01 $38.45 
 
Years 6 7 8 9 10 
% Grant 4.58% 5.31% 6.02% 6.73% 7.43% 
Dollars $45.80 $53.05 $60.22 $67.29 $74.28 
 
Years 12 15 20 25 30 
% Grant 8.8% 10.79% 13.95% 16.92% 19.71% 
Dollars $87.99 $107.93 $139.53 $169.20 $197.07 
 
Once again, a quick comparison of Tables 3 and 3A demonstrates that 
the benefit of using an S ESOP is smaller when interest on the incremental 
loan would otherwise be tax-deductible.  
Tables 2A and 3A give the tax advantage from an S ESOP over direct 
ownership of the S corporation assuming that the interest on the incremental 
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loan is deductible by the direct owner. Those calculations also assume that 
the interest on the base loan—65 percent of shares in the S ESOP—is not 
deductible by the direct owner. I made that assumption when I originally 
presented the tables so as to keep the same treatment of interest outside of the 
ESOP as within the ESOP. If, however, the interest on the incremental loan 
is deductible, presumably the interest on the base loan is deductible as well. 
In that case, the interest deductions from the base loan further reduce the tax 
benefit from holding shares through an S ESOP. Table 4A gives the present 
value of the tax deductions from a self-amortizing loan at 3.7 percent that 
covers the cost of the base loan—65 percent of the shares in the ESOP—as a 
function of the loan term. 
 
Table 4: Tax Benefit from Borrowing with Deductible Interest Rather than 
Through an ESOP (As a function of the Loan Term) (Assumes Loan is Self-
Amortizing, Constant Payment over Term) 
 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 
% Grant 1.26% 1.89% 2.55% 3.21% 3.88% 
Dollars $12.62 $18.89 $25.55 $32.12 $38.78 
 
Years 6 7 8 9 10 
% Grant 4.55% 5.23% 5.92% 6.61% 7.32% 
Dollars $45.50 $52.31 $59.19 $ 66.15 $ 73.18 
 
Years 12 15 20 25 30 
% Grant 8.37% 9.41% 10.44% 11.05% 11.44% 
Dollars $ 83.69 $ 94.14 $104.44 $110.50 $114.42 
 
Table 4 is not directly comparable to Tables 2A and 3A. The reason is 
that Tables 2A and 3A give the value of using an S ESOP as a function of the 
time the assets are held in the ESOP.125 In contrast, Table 4 gives the cost of 
borrowing money through an S ESOP (using a level-payment loan) as a 
function of the loan term. The tables cannot simply be compared because the 
loan term might not be the same as the ESOP term. Thus, to use the tables 
together, the loan term gives the value from Table 4. That value is then used 
with the value generated by either Table 2A or 3A using the ESOP term. 
Consider first the case when the S corporation generates deferred capital 
gain. When the loan term is ten years, the cost of borrowing through the 
ESOP is more than 7 percent of the principal amount of the loan. Looking at 
Table 2A, the benefit of investing through an ESOP for 30 years is less than 
6 percent. Thus, a participant is generally better off borrowing and 
purchasing the shares on personal account when the S corporation stock 
generates deferred capital gain and she can borrow on the same terms as the 
ESOP and deduct her interest.  
                                                                                                                   
125 If the funds withdrawn from the ESOP are rolled over into another qualified 
account, then the proper term to use is the total time that the funds are held in qualified 
accounts. 
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When the S corporation generates current ordinary income, the tax 
benefits from investing through an ESOP are roughly equal to the tax cost of 
borrowing through the ESOP assuming the loan term equals the time the 
assets are held in the ESOP. In the example, the difference in value for a ten-
year loan and a ten-year ESOP is less than one tenth of one percent. For 
shorter holding periods, the personal account is more tax efficient; for longer 
holding periods, the ESOP is more efficient. The amounts, however, are not 
large unless the ESOP term is much longer than the loan term.126 
Thus, when interest on a loan outside of the ESOP would be tax-
deductible, the tax benefit from using an S ESOP is much less than that given 
in the prior section. Depending on the term of the ESOP loan, the mix of 
ordinary income and long-term capital gain produced by the S corporation, 
and how long the employees will leave their securities in qualified accounts, 
there might not be any tax advantage over direct ownership from using an 
S ESOP. 
E. Caveats in the Estimates 
The above calculations generally represent an upper bound for the tax 
benefit that can be obtained by using an S ESOP instead of direct ownership 
in an S corporation. There are various assumptions buried in those 
calculations. Several of those assumptions deserve attention. 
First, the extent to which the S ESOP provides the employee with a tax 
advantage depends upon whether the S ESOP offsets other holdings in 
qualified accounts. If the S ESOP replaces holdings in another qualified 
account, then, in general, there is no tax savings.127 If, however, the ESOP 
does not replace other holdings in qualified accounts, but supplements them, 
then the participant receives a tax benefit. The benefit of expanding a 
qualified account is not unique to ESOPs. There are generally other qualified 
accounts that can be used. Moreover, the limits for such accounts are 
generally for total contributions to all such accounts; there are not separate 
                                                                                                                   
126 The adjustment in Table 4 raises the obvious question: what do we do if the 
taxpayer would not otherwise borrow to invest? In that case, do we still use Table 4? The 
adjustment in Table 4 reflects the value of an arbitrage opportunity. By borrowing and 
deducting interest, an investor can earn an arbitrage profit by investing on the same terms 
through a tax-advantaged vehicle. The question becomes: Would or could the investor 
take advantage of this opportunity, which can be done either through tax-advantaged 
borrowing or by selling fully taxable assets to fund the alternative investment? If the 
answer is yes, then the adjustment in Table 4 should be made; otherwise, the adjustment 
should not be made. My guess—and this is only a guess—is that the adjustment is 
probably appropriate for wealthy and financially sophisticated parties, but not for the vast 
majority of ESOP participants. 
127 I use the qualifier “in general” because whether there is a tax saving depends on 
the relative tax efficiency of the displaced investments in the qualified account. For 
example, if the displaced investments would be taxed at 35 percent, and the ESOP assets 
would be deferred and taxed at 15 percent, then the S ESOP does not produce a tax 
benefit, but has a tax cost. That is because it is more efficient to hold the displaced assets 
in a qualified account than the assets that displaced them. In other words, an ESOP is an 
efficient vehicle for holding stock of an S corporation that generates current ordinary 
income, but it is not as efficient for holding the stock of an S corporation that generates 
deferred capital gain.  
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limits for each type of account and hence additive.128 Also, most 
beneficiaries of S ESOPs are likely to have excess capacity in their qualified 
accounts. Accordingly, the adoption of an S ESOP is unlikely to expand the 
capacity of qualified accounts, but at most only to expand the use of such 
accounts.129 
Second, the calculation of the tax benefit from using an S ESOP assumes 
that if stock in the S corporation were held directly the S corporation would 
not produce any tax shelter that flowed through to the holder. To the extent 
that there is tax shelter passed through to direct holders of shares in the 
S corporation, that is a benefit direct holders enjoy, but which indirect 
holders through an S ESOP do not. When such benefits take the form of tax 
deferral—generally by accelerating ordinary deductions and recapturing 
those deductions at ordinary rates—they reduce the relative benefit from an 
S ESOP, but they cannot surpass it. This is because the S ESOP, as a 
qualified account, provides the maximum amount of deferral over the period. 
However, when the tax shelter takes the form of accelerated deductions 
against ordinary income that are recaptured at a reduced long-term capital 
gains rate, then it is possible for the benefit of direct ownership to exceed the 
benefit of using an S ESOP.130 
Third, the above calculations assume that direct owners can purchase 
additional shares on personal account. If the S ESOP owns 100 percent of the 
company, then it would not be possible for a participant to purchase more 
shares (assuming that the business cannot be scaled up). In that case, it is not 
possible for participants to synthesize the increased exposure from directly 
holding the stock by making outside purchases. In such circumstances, it 
might be more attractive to hold the stock directly rather than through an 
ESOP because the holder can obtain greater exposure to the company’s 
stock.131 That option, however, will be attractive only if the owners expect 
their stock price to appreciate at a rate greater than the risk-adjusted rate of 
return. Thus, an acquirer who thought she was acquiring the corporation at a 
discount to its actual value, and who expects the resulting excess return to 
take the form of capital gains, might prefer to hold as much of her interest as 
possible outside of the ESOP. 
A fourth assumption that was used to arrive at the above results is that 
the holders of direct interests who pay tax at long-term capital-gain tax rates 
do not die while holding those interests, nor do they contribute those interests 
                                                                                                                   
128 Also, the contribution limits for S ESOPs are stricter than the limits for some 
other qualified accounts inasmuch as dividend payments count towards the limit with S 
ESOPs, but not with other qualified accounts. 
129 Many S ESOPs own 100 percent of the sponsoring company. Rosen, supra note 
76, at i. In such circumstances, all of the company’s income is passed through to the 
ESOP and deferred. No portion of an S corporation 100 percent owned by an ESOP is 
subject to current taxation. Although such income is not currently taxed, it will be 
eventually taxed to participants. Once again, there is no benefit if the S ESOP replaces 
another qualified account. If it does not, then the effect is to expand use of qualified 
accounts. 
130 I also assume that the S corporation does not produce phantom income, which 
might occur if the inside basis were lower than the outside basis. I also assume that the 
tax treatment of increases and decreases in income are symmetric. 
131 A similar situation occurs with restricted stock. 
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to charities.132 The calculations assume that such holders pay capital gain tax 
when they sell their shares. If they never pay that tax, either because they die 
holding their shares and their heirs receive a step-up in basis, or because they 
contribute the shares to charity and can avoid the tax, then the tax 
consequences of direct ownership and ownership through an ESOP are the 
same.133 
Fifth, the above calculations assume that the income tax does not capture 
any portion of the return that compensates for risk. Instead, the calculations 
assume that only the risk-free rate of return is captured by any tax. This 
assumption is standard in the academic literature—both legal and 
economic—but is often met with skepticism by investors and their 
advisors.134 It is also more likely to be true for wealthy and sophisticated 
investors than for other investors. 
Sixth, the calculations assume that the corporation generates the same 
cash flow whether its shares are held directly or through an S ESOP.135 That 
assumption has the advantage of isolating the tax consequences of using an 
S ESOP by separating the tax and non-tax consequences of using an S ESOP. 
The empirical evidence, however, shows that the adoption of an ESOP leads 
to greater productivity and increased cash flow.136 
The above discussion suggests that there is little, if anything, unique 
about the tax benefits afforded to S ESOPs and little reason for an 
S corporation to adopt an S ESOP solely to obtain tax benefits. Whatever 
benefits the S ESOP structure provides will often be available through other 
means. Numerous structures provide for pass-through taxation and other 
qualified accounts provide for exemption of the return earned on the assets in 
an account while they are in a qualified account. Moreover, when an S ESOP 
offsets an equally tax-efficient qualified account, there is no net tax benefit 
from using an S ESOP. And when it does not offset another qualified 
account, then the effect of establishing an S ESOP is simply to expand the 
use of such accounts. Also, if the participant could have borrowed on the 
same terms on personal account and deducted the interest, then any benefit 
from using an S ESOP is likely to be largely (if not entirely) offset by the 
additional cost of borrowing through the ESOP.  
V. ZELL’S TRIBUNE TRANSACTION 
 In April 2007, the Tribune, a publicly traded C corporation, 
announced that it had agreed to an $8.2 billion buyout offer from a group led 
                                                                                                                   
132 An owner cannot contribute shares in an S corporation to a charity without 
causing the S corporation to become a C corporation. That is because a charity is not a 
permissible holder of S corporation stock. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1). 
133 When the S corporation generates current ordinary income, holding the stock 
until death or contributing the stock to charity will not avoid tax on any income. 
134 See discussion infra nn. 173–79 and accompanying text. 
135 Another assumption that is implicit in making the calculations is that the 
company would not otherwise be a C corporation, or if it were it would not pay a 
substantial amount of tax.  
136 The empirical studies regularly find significant and substantial productivity gains 
when a company adopts an ESOP. See Freeman, supra note 6 (surveying studies of 
ESOPs). 
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by Samuel Zell.137 In December 2007, the buyout was completed, leaving 
the Tribune as the largest 100-percent ESOP-owned S corporation  138 and 
the fifth-largest majority employee-owned company in the United States.139 
The transaction is complicated. The description below captures the essential 
features of that transaction for the discussion that follows.  
The acquisition took place in two stages. In the first stage, Zell made a 
$250 million investment in the Tribune, the ESOP borrowed $250 million 
from the Tribune and purchased nine million shares at $28 a share, and the 
Tribune borrowed $7 billion and redeemed shares at $34 a share.140 Thus, 
the ESOP purchased its shares at a substantial discount to Zell.141 
                                                                                                                  
In the second stage, the Tribune converted from a C corporation to an 
S corporation.142 The Tribune then borrowed an additional $3 billion, and it 
acquired all outstanding shares not held by the ESOP, leaving the Tribune as 
a 100-percent owned S corporation.143 The Tribune also redeemed Zell’s 
initial $250 million investment.144 Shortly thereafter, Zell made a $315 
million investment in the form of a $225 million subordinated note and the 
purchase of a warrant for $90 million.145 The warrant, which can be 
exercised anytime within fifteen years of issuance, gives Zell the right to 
acquire 40 percent of the Tribune from the ESOP.146 The exercise price of 
the warrant starts at $500 million and increases by $10 million a year until it 
reaches $600 million, where it remains until it expires.147 
The transaction has many interesting aspects, but from a tax perspective 
what is most interesting is the warrant.148 The warrant allows Zell to acquire 
 
137 Until approved by the shareholders, the Tribune’s board of directors had an 
obligation to consider other bids, but if they accepted another offer, Zell would have 
received a $25 million break-up fee. See Seelye & Siklos, supra note 23 (describing the 
$25 million break-up fee as relatively low).  
138 Tribune Deal Closes: Company to Become the Largest 100% ESOP S-Corp, 
OWNERS AT WORK, 3 (Winter 2007/2008). 
139 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, THE EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 100: 
AMERICA’S LARGEST MAJORITY EMPLOYEE-OWNED COMPANIES (2007), 
http://www.nceo.org/library/eo100.html. 
140 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8.  
141 Zell had planned for the Tribune to sell some assets, such as the Chicago Cubs, 
before converting the Tribune from a C corporation to an S corporation. If assets are sold 
within ten years after conversion, the gain on those assets is still subject to corporate level 
tax. However, that tax might be avoided if the assets are sold constructively instead of 
actually. Robert Willens, Will Tribune Corp. Pay Tax on Asset Divestitures?, BNA 
DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 7, 2008, at 25. 
142 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 9.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 8. 
145 Id. at 9.  
146 Id. Zell is also chairman of the Tribune. I ignore any interest he has in the ESOP 
as an employee. 
147 Id. The effective price of any shares acquired by Zell through the warrant is at 
least $34 a share. McIntyre, supra note 1 at 8. 
148 According to one estimate, between 15 and 20 percent of S ESOPs use some 
form of synthetic equity. Proposed Synthetic Equity Tax, supra note 17, at 3–4 (citing 
Loren Rodgers, Director of Research for the National Center for Employee Ownership). 
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a 40-percent interest in the Tribune for between $500 million and $600 
million.149 Some press reports suggested that Zell made a very good deal at 
the expense of the remaining ESOP participants because he obtained the right 
to purchase 40 percent of the Tribune for less than $1 billion.150 Those 
reports, however, ignore the debt on the Tribune, which makes the real 
acquisition cost—and the value of the company at which the warrant 
becomes worth exercising—much higher than the warrant’s exercise 
pric
uccess, he would have a combination of 
ord
                                                                                                                  
e.151 
From a tax perspective, what is interesting about the warrant is that it is a 
capital asset in Zell’s hands. If Zell held a 40-percent interest in the Tribune 
directly, then he would be allocated 40 percent of all income that the Tribune 
earned after payment of expenses, including interest, compensation, and 
allowances for depreciation and amortization.152 Accordingly, if the 
acquisition was very successful and the Tribune produced large amounts of 
current ordinary income that it used to pay down the debt, then 40 percent of 
that income would be allocated to Zell. Moreover, Zell would have to pay tax 
on that income at the ordinary income tax rate of 35 percent.153 
Alternatively, if the acquisition did not produce large amounts of current 
ordinary income, but was still very successful because of the prospect of 
large future revenues, Zell could then sell his shares for a profit. That profit 
would be taxed as long-term capital gain, which currently has a top tax rate 
of 15 percent.154 Most likely, if Zell held his interest in the Tribune directly, 
and if the transaction were a s
inary income and deferred long-term capital gain.  
There are, thus, two tax advantages to Zell from holding his Tribune 
interest as an S ESOP derivative rather than as a direct interest in the 
S corporation. First, Zell can dispose of his warrant at any time within its 15-
year life in a manner that will ensure that his entire gain (assuming that there 
is a gain) is capital.155 If Zell held that interest directly, he would likely have 
some ordinary income. Thus, the first benefit from the structure is conversion 
 
149 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8. There are limits on the percentage interest that 
anyone can hold of the shares of an S ESOP, either directly or indirectly through a 
derivative. The Code calls such derivatives synthetic equity and limits ownership to a 50 
percent interest. I.R.C. § 409(p). For a discussion of the § 409(p) rules on prohibited 
allocations of securities in S ESOPs, see Kaplan et al., supra note 35, at A-32–A-36; 
Carolyn F. Zimmerman, Complying With the Section 409(p) Anti-Abuse Rules, in 
S CORPORATION ESOPS 93 (Scott Rodrick ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
150 E.g., The Conspiracy to Keep You Poor and Stupid, There’s Never a Financial 
Media Around When You Need One, http://www.poorandstupid.com/ (Apr. 6, 2007, 
13:28 EST); Jones, supra note 62. 
151 The pricing of the shares to the S ESOP and the terms of the warrant ensure that 
if Zell exercises his warrant, the participants will earn a higher return than Zell. Oneal 
&Rosenthal, supra note 23. 
152 The amortization and depreciation allowances are likely to be small relative to 
the acquisition price because it is usually optimal to acquire free standing C corporations, 
such as the Tribune, using a structure that does not lead to a step up in basis. See Scholes 
& Wolfson, supra note 56. 
153 See I.R.C. § 1366(a) (pass through of S corporation income to shareholders). 
154 S corporation stock is a capital asset under I.R.C. § 1221 and so its sale generates 
capital gain or loss under I.R.C. § 1222. 
155 Any losses are also likely to be capital. 
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of ordinary income into capital gain. Second, the warrant allows Zell to avoid 
paying tax on any portion of his gain until he disposes of his interest 
(assuming he disposes of that interest within fifteen years).156 If Zell held 
that interest directly, he would likely have some income in earlier years. 
Thu
 of the warrant are solely 
the 
                                                                                                                  
s, the second benefit is deferral of taxation. 
Another feature of the warrant is that it will not have adverse tax 
consequences for the ESOP participants. Their withdrawals, which are after 
dilution by the warrant (assuming the warrant is exercised), are taxed at 
ordinary income tax rates.157 In effect, the S ESOP blocks the Tribune’s tax 
consequences from being passed through to the participants until they 
withdraw their assets.158 Thus, the tax consequences
consequences for Zell: conversion and deferral. 
The key tax feature of the warrant is that it is taxed as a capital asset in 
Zell’s hands, not as an ownership interest.159 That treatment is not related to 
the warrant’s option element; it would apply as well to a forward contract.160 
Thus, consider a prepaid forward contract that entitles the holder to receive 
forty shares at a future date without an additional payment.161 The cost of 
such a forward is 40P0. If such a transaction were respected and taxed 
according to its form, then an ESOP participant would be taxed at the same 
time as the direct owner assuming that the owner was certain to receive all 
his income in the form of deferred capital gain.162 In order for an ESOP 
participant to have the same exposure as the forward contract holder, the 
ESOP must contain 52.3 shares.163 The after-tax cost to the ESOP participant 
of such shares is 34P0.164 Once again, the cost of the direct or derivative 
purchase is 6P0 more than the after-tax cost of acquiring the economically 
equivalent position through an ESOP. However, the direct or derivative 
purchase produces a basis of 40P0, which, in turn, produces a tax saving of 
6P0.165 That saving will pay off the principal, but not the interest, on the loan 
used to purchase the prepaid forward. Thus, the benefit from using an ESOP 
instead of a derivative contract is the interest paid on the amount of capital 
(unproductively) tied up by making a direct or derivative purchase instead of 
acquiring the position through an ESOP.166 In other words, the tax 
 
156 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 9.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Options and warrants both meet the definition of a capital asset under I.R.C. 
§ 1221. 
161 I assume the stock does not pay dividends. 
162 Both would be taxed at 15 percent and so on an after-tax basis would receive the 
appreciation on thirty-four shares. 
163 That is calculated as 34 shares / (1 - .35). 
164 That is calculated as 52.3 shares × (1 - .35) × P0. 
165 Because all income is capital gain, the basis produces a saving at the 15 percent 
capital gains rate. 
166 The text assumes that either the direct purchase is funded out of cash that would 
otherwise be invested in a manner that generates ordinary interest income or the interest 
paid on any borrowing is not deductible.  
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thro
ough another 
qua
 an interest in the form of a derivative on the S ESOP 
rather than holding shares in the S corporation directly is given by the 
following equation:  
 
sequences of holding a derivative on an S ESOP are not as attractive as 
those of holding the economically equivalent position through an S ESOP.  
More generally, the tax advantage of holding an interest through an 
S ESOP rather than through a derivative upon shares in the ESOP is given by 
equation (1). Accordingly, Table 2 gives the advantage from an S ESOP as a 
function of how long the assets are held in the ESOP. That advantage does 
not depend upon whether the income is current ordinary income or deferred 
capital gain. That is because the ES
ugh, whether the interest is held through the ESOP or in the form of a 
derivative on the shares in the ESOP.  
Returning to the Tribune transaction, Zell could not have acquired his 
interest through an ESOP, nor could he have acquired it thr
lified account.167 Thus, Zell was left with the choice between holding his 
interest in the Tribune directly or through an ESOP derivative. 
The advantage of the derivative is that it treats all income— whether 
current and ordinary or deferred and capital—as deferred capital gain.168 
Accordingly, the two structures yield the same tax result when all of the 
income is deferred capital gain. If, however, all of the income is current and 
ordinary, then the tax benefit from the S ESOP structure is given by the 
difference between equations (2) and (1). In those circumstances, the benefit 
generated by holding
( )
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through an S ESOP derivative over holding such shares directly (assuming 
interest payments are deductible). 
 
                                                                                                                  
ause it assumes all of the income generated by the S corporation would be 
taxed currently as ordinary income if the shares were held directly.  
In Table 5, I use equation (3)
 
167 In an interview, Zell emphasized that, as chairman, he is also a Tribune 
employee and holds an interest through the ESOP. See Phil Rosenthal et al., On the 
Future, Dealmaking and Bad Press, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2007, at C1. That interest, 
however, is very small in comparison with his warrant. 
168 Tax Reduction and Control Act, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 409B (2007). Section 
3701 of H.R. 3970 would add § 409B to the Internal Revenue Code. That provision 
would tax holders of synthetic equity as if they owned the underlying equity directly. 
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Table 5: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP Derivative over Direct Ownership 
(As a function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct 
ownership is current ordinary income) 
 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 
% Grant 0.84% 1.65% 2.46% 3.27% 4.07% 
Dollars $ 8.40 $16.49 $24.58 $32.65 $40.71 
 
Years 6 7 8 9 10 
% Grant 4.87% 5.68% 6.48% 7.27% 8.07% 
Dollars $48.75 $56.77 $64.76 $72.73 $80.67 
 
Years 12 15 20 25 30 
% Grant 9.65% 11.99% 15.81% 19.51% 23.09% 
Dollars $96.45 $119.86 $158.07 $195.11 $230.86 
 
Equation (3) and Table 5 can be used to estimate an upper bound for 
Zell’s tax saving from the structure. The tax saving from the warrant is 
roughly that of a straight 40-percent interest in the ESOP if held as a 
derivative. Assume such an interest would be worth $100 million.169 At 
most, then, the derivative would save Zell taxes worth 12 percent of the value 
of his interest, or about $10 million. That assumes that the warrant is held for 
fifteen years before exercise and all of the income from direct ownership 
takes the form of currently taxed ordinary income earned ratably over the 
fifteen-year period, plus reinvestment in bonds. Although the tax saving is a 
large amount of money standing on its own, it is only a small portion—less 
than one percent—of the total acquisition cost of the Tribune. Thus, the tax 
advantages of the structure would have allowed Zell to raise his bid for the 
Tribune by less than one percent. 
Once again, it is important to recognize the assumptions under which the 
calculations in Table 5 were made. They include the following: 
 
(i) there is no qualified account available; 
(ii) the investor can borrow at the same interest rate as the ESOP and 
can generate a tax deduction on that borrowing; 
(iii) there is effectively no taxation of the return to risk bearing; 
(iv) all income is current and ordinary; 
(v) the asset does not generate any tax shelter (symmetry of tax 
treatment); and 
(vi) the S corporation generates the same cash flow with or without an 
S ESOP.170 
 
The first assumption is reasonable to make for Zell, as is the second. He 
is very likely to be able to borrow on the same terms as the ESOP and deduct 
his interest. However, the ESOP will borrow very little—about 3 percent of 
                                                                                                                   
169 Zell paid $90 million for the warrant, presumably market value for that interest. 
McIntyre, supra note 20, at 1. 
170 Another assumption in the calculations is that the company would not otherwise 
be a C corporation, or if it were, it would not pay a substantial amount of tax. 
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the Tribune’s debt.171 Thus, the effect of the assumption that interest on 
Zell’s share of the ESOP loan would be deductible by Zell if he borrowed the 
money himself is small. 
The third assumption, however, is the key. According to Merrill Lynch’s 
projections, the Tribune will generate free cash flow, after accounting for 
capital spending, of close to $300 million in 2008, rising to over $500 million 
by 2012.172 If Zell were the direct owner of a 40 percent stake in the Tribune, 
and if such cash flow were realized, then 40 percent of that cash flow would 
be taxable to Zell each year. However, with the S ESOP derivative, Zell is 
taxed at capital gains rates on that return when he sells his stake. If the 
Tribune were to generate $300 million a year in free cash flow that it used to 
pay down its debt, then Zell would receive 40 percent of the benefit, or $120 
million a year. If Zell held his interest directly, that income would be 
allocated to him for inclusion on his annual tax return. His tax, at a 35 
percent tax rate, is $42 million a year. Over ten years, say, his tax from the 
Tribune paying down its debt would total $420 million, with a present value 
of $345.8 million.173 In contrast with direct ownership, the warrant converts 
that income into capital gain. Thus, Zell’s tax bill from the Tribune paying 
down $3 billion in debt—$1.2 billion of which is Zell’s share—is $180 
million. Moreover, because Zell pays that tax when he sells the warrant, 
assumed to be ten years after its acquisition, the present value of that tax is 
only $125.2 million. In such circumstances, the warrant would appear to save 
Zell $220 million in taxes over direct ownership. 
Yet it is questionable whether there is such a large tax benefit from the 
structure. The Tribune was sold at auction at a substantial premium. No one 
has suggested that the total purchase price paid by Zell, which includes the 
debt assumed, was below the market price. There does not appear to be 
money left on the table by the Zell group. That suggests that if there is a 
reasonable expectation of such a cash flow on such a small equity investment 
it must be because of the high level of risk assumed by Zell. That there is an 
incremental return to risk-bearing is well documented in the economic 
literature.174 The question is whether the tax system captures that return.  
 More than sixty years ago, Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave 
showed that the income tax does not tax the return to risk-bearing as long as 
the tax system taxes above and below average returns symmetrically.175 In 
such a case, they show that the taxpayer can eliminate the tax on risk by 
borrowing and scaling up her investment in the risky asset by 1/(1–t), where t 
is the tax rate on incremental gains and losses.176 
                                                                                                                   
171 The ESOP will borrow $250 million, which is about three percent of the 
Tribune’s $8.5 billion borrowing to complete the transaction. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 
1.  
172 Oneal & Rosenthal, supra note 23. 
173 The tax is discounted at the after-tax interest rate of 3.7 percent a year. 
174 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 957–58. In the standard capital asset 
pricing model, the return to risk bearing comes from bearing systematic as opposed to 
unsystematic risk. See id. at 188–91; STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 284–
87 (7th ed. 2005).  
175 See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation 
and Risk Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944).  
176 See id. 
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 The Domar-Musgrave result has been the source of a large and 
growing literature.177 Although there are some questions as to how well the 
result holds in the economy at large, there is generally a consensus that 
sophisticated and wealthy taxpayers can and do make the adjustments that 
eliminate the tax on the risk premium.178 Zell is certainly a wealthy and 
sophisticated investor.179 He could offset the tax consequences of the risky 
element of his derivative ownership of stock by borrowing and increasing 
that interest from 40 percent to 61.5 percent.180 More simply, instead of 
borrowing, he could have taken some part in the $225 million loan he made 
to the Tribune and used that money instead to purchase a larger interest in the 
Tribune.181 
 The point of the exercise above is not the mechanics, but to show 
that the claim that the S ESOP creates substantial value because it defers and 
converts from ordinary income into capital gain—which is the source of most 
of the income he expected to receive—the income Zell would receive as 
compensation for taking on risk is questionable. That is because Zell, through 
fairly simple adjustments, could have avoided that tax. Thus, the claim that 
there are substantial tax benefits to Zell from using the S ESOP structure is 
also questionable.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
I think any reader who has followed me this far will agree that the tax 
consequences of S ESOPs are complex. Understanding those consequences 
takes more than just reading the law and looking at how one or more 
transactions are taxed. It requires consideration of the tax treatment of 
                                                                                                                   
177 See generally Lawrence Zelanek, The Sometimes Taxation of the Returns to 
Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006). 
178 Id. at 895. It is irrelevant whether an investor actually makes the adjustment. 
What matters is that the investor is taxed symmetrically on gains and losses so that such 
investor could offset the effect of the tax by borrowing and purchasing more of the asset.  
179 I assume that the Tribune’s debt is not guaranteed by Zell. Thus, if the Tribune 
experiences losses, they will only be borne by Zell to the extent of his investment in the 
Tribune, which is less than 3 percent of the total acquisition cost. If the Tribune performs 
poorly, most of the loss will be borne by the lenders. Thus, there is no large asymmetry 
that could cause the Domar-Musgrave result to break down. 
180 The mechanics of the offsetting transactions are more complicated than in the 
usual Domar-Musgrave example because tax on the interest held through the ESOP 
derivative is deferred whereas the tax payments with direct ownership are made over 
time, not at once. Simplifying, if Zell held 61.5 percent of the Tribune directly, he would 
benefit from every $300 million of free cash flow generated by the Tribune and used to 
pay down its debt to the extent of $185 million. On this amount, he would have to pay 
$65 million in tax, leaving him with a net benefit of $120 million. That is calculated as 
follows: 61.5% = 40% / (1 - .35). That is the same $120 million benefit he would receive 
if each year the Tribune paid down $300 million of its debt as projected by Merrill 
Lynch. 
181 Zell’s loan to the Tribune is subordinated to $8.5 billion in other loans. In effect, 
Zell is at risk for the entire equity investment, because his loan funds the ESOP share 
purchase, but he does not get all of the benefits, because the other ESOP beneficiaries 
receive 60 percent of the shares and are guaranteed to receive a higher return than is Zell. 
See McIntyre, supra note 1, at 9. 
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alternative structures and careful separation of the tax and non-tax 
consequences to all parties of using an S ESOP. 
Once alternative structures are considered, the claim that there are 
substantial and unique tax advantages from using an S ESOP is questionable. 
The most common argument—that the S ESOP structure allows employers to 
deduct principal on loan repayments—is mistaken. Deducting repayment of 
the principal on the ESOP loan is not a source of tax advantage; it is simply 
the deduction by an employer of compensation paid to an employee in the 
form of paying off an obligation of the employee. 
However, a second claim—that the S ESOP allows participants to defer 
their income—is true. In effect, the ESOP exempts the return on the assets 
contributed to the ESOP over the life of the ESOP. Although the S ESOP 
structure has that desirable characteristic, it is not unique in providing that 
benefit. Other structures, most notably other qualified accounts, provide that 
same benefit. Moreover, because the contribution limits on such accounts are 
not separate for each type of account, but instead there is a single limit for 
contributions to all of a beneficiary’s qualified accounts together, the use of 
an S ESOP does not expand access to such accounts; at most it only expands 
their use. 
Accordingly, in many circumstances, there will not be a substantial tax 
benefit from using an S ESOP. First, if the S ESOP displaces other qualified 
accounts, the effect is essentially a wash.182 Second, if the S ESOP 
participants can borrow on the same terms as the ESOP and deduct their 
interest payments, then there is also a cost from using a leveraged S ESOP. 
The participants, in effect, lose their interest deductions on the loan incurred 
through the ESOP as compared with borrowing outside of the ESOP and 
making an upfront contribution to an ESOP or another qualified account. In 
some circumstances, the tax cost from the lost interest deductions will equal 
or exceed the tax benefits from holding assets inside of an S ESOP. The tax 
cost to the owner of borrowing through an S ESOP (relative to the benefits of 
holding the purchased assets through an S ESOP) is larger the higher the 
leverage, the longer the duration of the loan relative to the duration of the 
investment, and the more deferred capital gain and the less current ordinary 
income the assets produce. 
Third, it is unlikely that a sophisticated buyer, such as Zell, would realize 
a substantial tax benefit from holding a synthetic interest in an S ESOP rather 
than a direct interest in an S corporation. That is because he can eliminate the 
tax he would pay on that portion of his income that is a return for bearing 
risk with a direct interest in the S corporation by engaging in offsetting 
portfolio transactions.183 
                                                                                                                   
182 The offset, however, will not always be equal even if the S ESOP displaces an 
equal amount of investment in other qualified accounts. That is because assets that 
produce current ordinary income are taxed more heavily than those that produce deferred 
capital gain. Accordingly, the tax benefit from holding the former in a qualified account 
is greater than the tax benefit from holding the latter. It thus follows that a company that 
produces a large amount of current ordinary income is a better candidate for an S ESOP 
than one that produces less current ordinary income and more deferred capital gain. 
183 Thus, the tax benefit from holding an interest through an S ESOP derivative 
rather than directly in an S corporation or other pass through entity is that the holder’s 
ordinary return is taxed as deferred long-term capital gain. To the extent that a direct 
interest will produce ordinary income instead of long-term capital gain or accelerate 
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At the end of the day, there can be a tax benefit from use of the S ESOP 
structure (with or without synthetic equity) rather than from direct 
ownership, but often there will be little, if any tax benefit from using an 
S ESOP relative to the tax benefits that can be achieved from using other 
feasible and readily available structures. Moreover, when there are tax 
benefits from using an S ESOP, most of those benefits will likely accrue to 
the smaller, less sophisticated investors at whom those benefits are targeted, 
and they will not be any greater than the benefits those same investors would 
achieve from expanding the use of qualified accounts. 
In December 2007, Zell purchased the Tribune using a novel S ESOP 
structure. That structure appeared to offer various tax benefits, which led 
many sophisticated commentators to opine that the S ESOP structure was the 
wave of the future.184 However, as the analysis above shows, although Zell 
might have achieved some tax benefits to Zell from using an S ESOP that he 
could not have achieved with another structure, any such benefits were very 
small relative to the size of the transaction. Thus, the S ESOP structure 
should not have permitted Zell to pay substantially more for the Tribune and 
is unlikely to enable future bidders to pay substantially more for other target 
companies. 
It is, of course, a separate question whether the appearance of connecting 
large amounts of ordinary income into long-term capital gain and deferring 
tax on that gain led Zell and his advisors to believe there would be large tax 
benefits from the S ESOP structure and hence induced him to raise his bid 
accordingly. However, as this Article shows, the appearance of those benefits 
was only an appearance. There were no large tax advantages from the 
structure.  
 
income, there is a tax benefit from using an S ESOP derivative. However, that tax benefit 
is only on that portion of the ordinary return on the equity investment that the derivative 
defers or recharacterizes. 
184 See note 24, supra, and accompanying text. 
